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NOTES
INSURANCE AS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
For seventy-five years and since Paul v. Virginia,' the United States
Supreme Court has consistently held insurance business in and among
the states not to be interstate commerce. 2 This holding has been repeat-
edly challenged on many grounds, but always affirmed. It is to be noted
that the question involved in all these cases was the power of a state
to regulate insurance. In none of them was the Sherman Act or any
other Congressional act directly involved. In reliance upon this holding
insurance business acquired a doctrinal status under which most states
have developed extensive and effective systems of insurance control
without federal intervention.
By a majority of four to three the Supreme Court of the United
States in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association3
has now held insurance in and of itself to be interstate commerce under
the Commerce Clause and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The decision
answers affirmatively two questions: 1) Do fire insurance companies
carrying on business across the state lines engage in interstate com-
merce under the commerce clause? 2) Did Congress include or intend
to include insurance business in the Sherman Act of 1890?
The case came to the Supreme Court on the question of the validity
of a federal grand jury indictment of two hundred private stock fire
insurance companies and twenty-seven individuals for the alleged
violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. They were charged with the
violation of interstate trade and commerce laws by fixing and maintain-
ing arbitrary and non-competitive rates, and of monopolizing the trade
and commerce in the fire insurance field and allied lines in and among
six states.4 Many coercive methods were used to compel non-member
companies to join the conspiracy. To those who refused, re-insurance
and all other insurance facilities were denied. Ninety percent of the
fire insurance in the six states was controlled by the conspiracy.
In the District Court a demurrer was interposed on the theory that
insurance was not commerce, and, therefore, compliance with the
Sherman Act could not be enforced. The demurrer was sustained, and
I Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869).
2 Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (p.655), 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895).
Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367 (p. 370), 17 S.Ct. 110, 41 L.Ed. 472 (1896).
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (p.401), 20 S.Ct. 962, 44
L.Ed. 1116 (1900).
Bothwell et al v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274 (p276), 48 S.Ct. 124, 72
L. Ed. 277 (1927).
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (p.432), 56 S. Ct. 252, 80 L.Ed. 299 (1935).
3 United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass. 322 U.S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162,
88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944).
4Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia.
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the court held that "the business of insurance is not commerce either
intrastate or interstate." Appeal to the Supreme Court was taken under
the Criminal Appeal Act,5 and the judgment of the District Court was
there reversed.
The importance of the decision justifies a comparison and analy-
sis of the Majority and the two Dissenting Opinions, an analysis
of the recent act of Congress relative to insurance control, and an
interpretation of the modern trends of federal legislation as interpreted
by our Supreme Court.
Justice Black in the majority opinion held that insurance companies
which do business across state lines come within the commerce clause,
and any act or agreement on their part to restrain or monopolize the
insurance business comes within the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. In
answer to those who rely upon the long line of cases apparently holding
to the contrary,6 the Court points out that these cases merely decided
that the states had the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
insurance, and at no time did the Court directly decide that Congress
did not have power under the commerce clause to regulate insurance
carried on among the states. He distinguishes the present case in that
it presents for determination for the first time the issue of whether
or not Congress has the power under the commerce clause to regulate
insurance, and also whether Congress intended to and did include in-
surance within the regulatory power of the Sherman Act. 7 To hold
that Congress has no power under the commerce clause to regulate a
nation-wide insurance business, the court asserts, and to further hold
that Congress did not include in the Sherman Act agreements and acts
of insurance companies to arbitrarily fix rates, restrain competition,
and monopolize the insurance business, would deprive Congress of the
full constitutional right to carry out its express power under the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution; and would clearly contravene the
aims and purposes of the Sherman Act."
The Court further points out that a realistic appraisal of the many
activities which go into making up of insurance contracts and in carry-
ing on of the general business leads one to the inescapable conclusion
that a chain of commercial events binds all these activities into one close-
ly knitted pattern of nation-wide commercial intercourse from which no
5 18 U.S.C. Sec. 682, 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 682.
6 Note 2, Supra.
726 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1 and 2, 15 U.S.C.A. 1 and 2.
" Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (pp. 495-501) ; 60 S. Ct. 982, 84 L.
Ed. 1311 (1939).
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436, 48 L.Ed.
479 (1904).
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 52 S. Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed.
1204 (1931).
Parker v. Braun, 317 U. S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1942).
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one act can be completely separated. This inseparable bundle of activi-
ties, the Court points out, clearly fall within the definition of "Com-
merce" as stated by Chief Justice Marshall when he said, "Commerce,
undoubtedly, is traffic, it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches 9. . ."
This being the common understanding of the term "commerce,"
it can reasonably be inferred that Congress in the broad language of
the Sherman Act intended to make no exception to any business enter-
prise carried on a national basis and effecting the interests of people
throughout the nation. The Act'0 speaks of "every person," "every con-
tract," "every combination," "in restraint of trade or any part there-
of." As indicative of the mood of the period, between 1885 and 1912,
twenty-three states enacted laws forbidding insurance combination.
Wisconsin passed its Act in 1897. This fact together with the compre-
hensive language of the Act itself convinced the Court that insurance
was included in the Sherman Act.
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Stone, concedes that certain
phases of insurance business may be the subject of appropriate federal
power, but takes the strong position that the business of insurance it-
self "-the formation and performance of insurance contracts-is not
under the protection of the Commerce Clause nor is the fixing of rates
within the prohibitory power of the present Sherman Act. It is the
universal view, he asserts, that the making of a contract' 2 which does
not stipulate for the carrying of goods or the rendition of service in or
related to interstate commerce is not in itself an act of interstate com-
merce, but merely a local activity over which Congress has no control.
A contract comes within the perview of the Act when its purpose is
to restrain or monopolize the marketing of commodities or services in
interstate commerce. Insurance contracts do not undertake to supply
or market these goods or services, but merely create an obligation to
pay a certain sum of money upon the happening of a contingency. As
such they are in a different classification from ordinary contracts deal-
ing with goods or services, and without more, do not come within the
commerce clause or the Sherman Act. Congress knew at the time of
passing the Sherman Act that this Court held that insurance is not
9 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (pp. 189-190), 2 L.Ed. 23 (1824).
10 15 U.S.C. 1 and 2, 15 U.S.C.A. 1 and 2 (1890).
"New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 34 S. Ct. 167,
58 L.Ed. 332 (1913).
12 Ware and Leland vs. Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405, 28 S. Ct. 526, 52 L.Ed.
855 (1907).
Western Live Stock Co. vs. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 58 S.
Ct. 546, 82 L.Ed. 823 (1937).
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commerce, and its debates and the subsequent history of this legislation
show that insurance was not included in the Act.
The Chief Justice indicates the impracticability of the majority po-
sition when it indicates that the effects of the decision will loosen a flood
of litigation between the two governments, during which time both in-
surance business and the two governments might experience the most
confusing state of affairs in the history of insurance business and in-
surance legislation. It is the duty of the Court, he says, to make certain
that before a precedent is overruled greater harm is not done in reject-
ing it than in retaining it.1' It is frequently the case that it is more
important to have a rule settled than to have it settled right. To this,
Justice Jackson added in his dissenting opinion that "abstract logic may
support them (the Majority) but the common sense and wisdom of
the situation seems opposed." By this decision, Justice Stone maintains
most of the control is taken away from the states and is placed in the
federal government which does not possess the necessary facilities to
administer the insurance business.
Justice Jackson points out that the time is ripe for appropriate fed-
eral legislation over insurance, but the change must come not from this
Court but from Congress.
The congressional reaction to this decision was immediate. The
need for a federal law to retard the perplexing consequences of the
decision became imperative. The Senate and the House considered the
decision, the most revolutionary in our history. Both Houses, the Presi-
dent, and the Attorney General favored some congressional law in the
form of a moratorium. Bill S 340 was enacted on January 25, 1945.14
13 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (pp.666-670), 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987(1943).
"Public Law 15-79th Congress, Chapter 20-lst Session (S.340).
AN ACT
To express the intent of the Congress with reference to the regulation of the
business of insurance.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress hereby declares
that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the
business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of
the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation
or taxation of such business by the several States.
SEC. 2. (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or super-
sede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business
of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such
Act specijfcally relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after
January , 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman
Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act,
and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission
Act, as amended, shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State law.
SEC. 3. (a) Until January 1, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
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The new law provides that in the interest of the public the regula-
tion, and taxation of the insurance business shall remain under the con-
trol of the States. It sets no time limit during which time the states are
to have this control, but expressly provides that mere silence on the
part of Congress should not be construed to impose any barrier to any
existing or future state law affecting the regulation on taxation of in-
surance. This will give state legislators an added assurance that their
extensive legislation will not be interfered with by mere judicial con-
struction. Moreover, it will prevent litigation which might arise under
the belief that certain laws might apply to the business of insurance.
This is made even more certain by Section Two of the Act which pro-
vides that no previous or future act of Congress shall invalidate or
supersede any state law regulating insurance unless such act expressly
refers to the business of insurance. This provision does not set any
time limit during which time Congress might pass a law specifically
regulating insurance. It also puts at rest widespread refusal, already ex-
isting in many states, on part of insurance companies to pay their taxes
due to the states. There is, however, the express provision limiting the
time during which the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission
Act, and the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not
apply to the insurance business. The period extends to January 1, 1948.
These acts are not repealed during the period, but are merely made in-
effective as to the insurance business. On January 1, 1948, they will
automatically apply to the insurance business in the same manner as
they apply to any other business. This period of time will give states
ample opportunity to change many of their existing laws which may
be inconsistent with the various acts above mentioned. The new law
further provides that the Sherman Act shall apply to acts and agree-
ments which result in boycott, coercion, or intimidation. This phase of
the law applies at any time before or after 1948. It is to be noted that
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and the Act of June 19, 1936,
known as the Robinson-Patman Anti-discrimination Act, shall not apply to
the business of insurance or to acts in the conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall render the said Sherman Act in-
applicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation.
SEC. 4. Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to affect in any
manner the application to the business of insurance of the Act. of July 5,
1935, as amended, known as the National Labor Relations Act, or the Act of
June 25, 1938, as amended, known as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
or the Act of June 5, 1920, known as the Merchant Marine Act, 1920.
SEC. 5. As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the several States,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
SEC. 6. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such provision
to any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of the
Act, and the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other
than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected.
Approved March 9, 1945.
19451 NOTES
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the provision makes no mention of restraint of commerce or monopoly
of business. This means that the insurance companies may enter into
agreements and perform acts resulting in a monopoly of tjhe business
of insurance during this period of grace without violating this law of
Congress.
Section Four of the Act further provides that the National Labor
Relation Act, the Fair Labor Standard Act, and the Merchant Marine
Act, shall be applicable to the business of insurance or any part thereof.
The Congressional Record,15 clearly indicates that this law is a mere
moratorium attempting to prevent devastating effects of the decision in
the Underwriters case. It indicates that it is not the purpose of Congress
to disturb the ruling of this Court that insurance business is interstate
commerce. There is no indication as to when or to what extent Con-
gress might bring into its orbit the regulation of insurance. It seems to
be apparent, however, that both Houses of Congress are reluctant in
depriving states of their power to regulate insurance and in voting this
power in the federal government.
Assuming that Congress will legislate on this subject, how will the
Supreme Court construe this legislation? Recent legislative decisions of
the Supreme Court clearly indicate the present trend of the Court and
furnish the best answer to this question.
In Houston, East & West Texas Rr. Co. v. United States, 6 the I. C.
C. compelled the freight carriers within Texas to raise their intrastate
rates. The order of the Commission was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court. It was affirmed on the ground that under the Com-
merce Clause, Congress may, where discrimination exists against inter-
state rates, compel the states to raise the intrastate rates so as to con-
form to the interstate rates and thus end the discrimination. Here Texas
was charging lower rates per mile between, let's say, Point A and B
within Texas than it was charging for a shorter distance between, let's
say, Point C in Texas and D in Louisiana. The same situation existed in
Wisconsiny'7 where the rates for passengers between Chicago and any
point in Wisconsin were higher per mile than the rates charged between
points within the State of Wisconsin. Here the passengers traveling
through Wisconsin paid a higher rate per mile on the same train than
passengers who had purchased their fare in Wisconsin and traveled
wholly within Wisconsin. The defense here was that the Wisconsin
Legislature and the people of the state were satisfied with the intrastate
rates. This was over-ruled and the order of the Commission was af-
15 Congressional Record, 1113-21-Vol. 91 (28).
16 Houston East & West Texas Rr. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 S. Ct.
833, 58 L.Ed. 1341 (1914).
17Railroad Commission vs. Chicago, B & Q Rr. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 42 S. Ct. 232,
66 L.Ed. 371 (1922).
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firmed by our Supreme Court. The Court states that Congress has the
power under the commerce clause to enable railroads to earn a fair
profit in intrastate trips so that the interstate traffic in the United States
will not be burdened with bankrupt and non-profit making roads.
Five large meat packers were charged with the violation of the
Stockyard Act.' They were charged with monopolizing the stock-
yard facilities, discrimination and abuse in the prices paid to farmers
at the stockyards, and with failure to pay proper commission to brokers,
etc. The animals came to Chicago from many different States. In
Chicago they were slaughtered and a large quantity of the meat was
consumed there while the balance of the meat was shipped to other
states. The defense here was that the acts in question were purely local
because the animals had come to rest and no interstate commerce actu-
ally existed at the time. It was held that the Chicago stockyards were a
mere throat in which a temporary stop took place in the flow of inter-
state commerce. Most of the meat from Chicago was sent to eastern
states, and unless the federal government could control local activities,
the effect upon the markets of the East would be disastrous.
Under the N.L.R.A., an employee is protected against discrimination
for joining or supporting a labor union. In the case of National Labor
Relation Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,19 it was found
that various union officers, employees of the said corporation, were dis-
charged. Discrimination was alleged. The board so found and ordered
the corporation desist from such conduct in the future, and rehire them.
The company contended that the Board had no jurisdiction of the case
due to the fact that the products upon which these men were working
were not actually in interstate commerce. It was held that the N.L.R.B.
had jurisdiction since the local business of the corporation substantially
affected interstate commerce. The local acts could not be separated from
this continuous flow of commerce and the federal government could not
be denied the power to regulate. There was said
"the term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce, or burdening
or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or hav-
ing led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or ob-
structing commerce or the free flow of commerce."
In Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relation
Board,20 a strike took place in a canning factory in California; canning
of fruits was stopped. Thirty-seven per cent of the fruits here packed
were shipped in commerce. The Labor Board intervented. It was con-
's Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 42 S. Ct. 397, 66 L.Ed. 735 (1922).
19 National Labor Relation Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937).
20 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. vs. National Labor Relation Board, 303 U.S.
453, 58 S. Ct. 656, 82 L.Ed. 954 (1937).
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tended that the products had not yet begun the interstate trip. It was
held that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause extends
not only to products already in commerce, but also to those which have
not yet begun their interstate commerce but were intended for inter-
state commerce.
Under the theory that the people in the United States would have
to pay higher prices for coal and thus affect or burden commerce, the
federal government regulated the price for coal at the mines. The court
sustained the price fixing in the Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adking.2 '
In Mulford v. Sith 2 2 a tax imposed on local warehousemen was
sustained. The federal government placed a restriction on the produc-
tion of tobacco. Each farmer was given a quota to produce. Whenever
any one of these farmers exceeded the quota, the tobacco warehouse-
men were required by the government to pay a tax equal to 50% of
the market price of the excess production. The warehousemen in turn
deducted the sum from the price paid to the farmer. It was contended
that this imposition regulated agriculture which was considered to be
a local activity. It was held that the warehouse was a mere throat in
the flow of commerce and what happened there directly or substan-
tially affected the tobacco markets of the country. Congress may tax
any activity to promote and foster commerce.
A suit in equity was brought to enjoin the enforcement of the Agri-
culture Act against the petitioner because he violated the production
quota. He claimed that he consumed the excess production on the farm
and that it could not in any way affect the supply on the markets. Held:
under the Commerce Clause Congress may regulate or fix prices of
interstate products and every act, though local, affecting prices may
also be regulated. The excess production of wheat though consumed
by the family on the farm comes within this power.-Wickard v. Fil-
burn.23
Under the N.L.R.A., the Associated Press2 4 was held to be inter-
state commerce. The association collects news items and dispatches
them to member newspapers. Freedom of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution was the defense. Held that the use made of interstate
facilities brings it within the federal power.
In United States v. Darby,25 Congress attempted to regulate wages,
hours and working conditions of workers working in a local lumber
mill. The defense was that the products were either not yet manufac-
tured or not shipped in commerce. Held: the power of Congress under
21 Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adking, 310 U.S. 381 (1941).
22 Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L.Ed. 1092 (1939).2sWickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed 122 (1942).
24 Associated Press v. National Labor Relation Board, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct.
650, 81 L.Ed. 953 (1937).
2 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L.Ed. 309 (1941).
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the Commerce Clause extends not only to the products actually in com-
merce, or those ready to be shipped to other states, but also to those
which are merely intended to be shipped in commerce. This fact gives
power to the federal government to regulate the very initial step of
production.
In the Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relation Board,"
the Court held that a strike in Chicago, at the central office of the
insurance company doing insurance business in thirty-six states inter-
fered with the movement of bills, notices, premiums, etc., and directly
affected commerce.
While these cases make clear the principle that commerce under
the Constitution does not stop at the border of a state, but that it con-
tinues into the state as far as it can affect the commerce between the
states, Congress has followed in the past as far as possible the prin-
ciple laid down in many cases that whenever the federal power is ex-
tended within what would otherwise be the dominion of the state
power, the justification for the exercise of the federal power must
clearly appear.2 7
It is a settled rule that in the absence of federal legislation a state
may regulate a local activity even though this regulation will also
affect interstate commerce provided it does not discriminate against or
burden such commerce. However, once the federal government regu-
lates, if the local law interferes with the federal regulation, the latter
must yield. It is also possible that both the federal and state govern-
ments may tax or regulate the same activity.28 The two governments
would each have its own orbit and one would not interfere with the
rights of the other.
Moreover, states may regulate many phases of interstate enter-
prises under the police power. Here the interests of the local citizens
may become paramount to national interests and Congress has felt and
the Court has sustained it, that the local interest, is best served by
allowing the local government to regulate.29 On this theory a Massa-
chusetts statute was sustained even though it prevented the sale of oleo-
28 Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relation Board, 322 U.S. 643, 64
S. Ct. 1196, 88 L.Ed. 1117 (1944).
27 Phelps Dodge Corp. vs. National Labor Relation Board, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.
Ct. 845, 85 L. Ed. 1271 (1940).
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (pp. 92-95),
63 S. Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1942).2 8 Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1638 (1941).
Union Brokerage Co. v. Jonsen, 322 U.S. 202, 64 S. Ct. 967, 88 L.Ed. 1227
(1943).
29 Schlollemberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 1, 188 S. Ct. 757, 43 L.Ed. 49 (1898).
Smith v. St. Louis S.W.R. Co., 181 U.S. 248, 21 S. Ct. 603, 45 L.Ed. 847 (1900).
South Carolina State Highway Dep't. v. Bornwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S.
Ct. 510, 82 L.Ed. 734 (1938).
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930, 85 L.Ed. 1219 (1940).
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margarine shipped interstate on the ground that it was made to look
like butter. The quarantine laws have also been sustained. Recently,
and after the Underwriters case was decided, a Wisconsin statute was
sustained under the police power of the state. It compelled a foreign
insurance company to deposit as a part of the premium 50% of a
membership fee charged to the Wisconsin policyholders, and a refusal
to make such deposit was the cause for revoking the license to do
business in Wisconsin.30 Minnesota was allowed to impose upon a
custom house broker engaged in interstate commerce a fee of $50.00
before it could come into the state courts. The Supreme Court held
that Minnesota had the power to supervise the activities of this broker
and a supervisory fee was not unconstitutional.31
Under Article one Section eight, Clause three of the Constitution,
Congress has the power to regulate commerce among the states. This
power is enlarged by Clause eighteen of the same Article which gives
power to make all laws necessary and proper for the carrying on of
the express powers. This means that there need not be an absolute
necessity, but merely the necessity to carry out a constitutional end.
However, a limitation seems to have been imposed, at least to the ex-
tent that the power cannot be used to destroy the federal system of
government guaranteed by the 10th Amendment. Nevertheless the
power is very broad and may be used by Congress to the fullest degree
and at the complete exclusion of state regulation under its delegated
powers. It was said in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.3 2
"... the commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the
execution of the powers of Congress over it as to make regula-
tion of the appropriate means of attainment of a legitimate end,
the effective execution of the granted powers to regulate com-
merce. The power over interstate commerce is plenary and com-
plete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent and acknowl-
edges no limitations other than those prescribed in the consti-
tution."
Notwithstanding these trends it is difficult to foresee precisely where
Congress will draw the line in accommodating the conflicting interests
of the state and federal governments in the field of insurance. The
mechanical separation of the business of insurance from its incidentals,
and the suggestion of Chief Justice Stone that Congress regulates only
30 State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. v. Duel, 65 S. Ct. 856 (1945).
696 (1944).
State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. v. Duel, 244 Wis. 429, 12 N.W. (2d)
31322 U.S. 202 (supra).32 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 62 S. Ct. 523, 86 L.Ed.
726 (1941).
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these incidentals by means of other express powers under the Consti-
tution leaving the business itself in the control of the states, seems
difficult to follow.
The extent of federal regulation for the present remains uncertain,
but the reaction of Congress to the perils into which the insurance
business and the several states had at once fallen as a result of the
decision in the Underwriters case was swift. Undoubtedly, much credit
for calling those perils to the attention of the nation is due to the ex-
cellent dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Stone. The Congressional
reaction is indicative of the desire on its part to prevent unnecessary
confusion, hardships and complications. It is hoped that this desire
will prevail when Congress will begin to legislate over the field of in-
surance. However, no one should assume that Congress will not exer-
cise all the power necessary to regulate insurance in an effective manner
and on a national scale, as said by Chief Justice Hughes in National
Labor Relation Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation;33
"Although activities may be intrastate in character when sepa-
rately considered, if they have such a close and substantial rela-
tion to interstate commerce that their control is essential or ap-
propriate to protect that commerce from burdens, and obstruc-
tions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that con-
trol."
JOSEPH J. ZINO.
3 301 U.S. 1 (supra).
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